took him more seriously is regrettable. I believe that Lady Mary and Berkes may have unwittingly struck a rich vein in the empire's intellectual development. Whether or not "Ottoman deism" ever existed in reality, at least in the way that Lady Mary imagined, the testimony of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Turkish and Arabic sources and of contemporary Europeans all points to a robust debate over fate, free will, and predestination. Indeed, the fact that these subjects posed philosophical and theological problems is not so much in question as why: what fed and sustained this debate? What underlying issues were at stake?
This article presents the context and content of this debate, providing background on key concepts and letting sources speak for themselves when possible. It then offers observations about the wider significance of free will and predestination in the Ottoman intellectual universe, particularly its relation to early modern bureaucratic and military reform. The article thus sheds light on a milieu that was asking anxious, searching questions about the human condition, the empire, and its ultimate fate.
CAUSALITY AND FREE WILL IN OTTOMAN THOUGHT
Before we can speak about the Ottomans, it is necessary to look backward a bit. Early modern Ottomans could draw on a very old discourse in Islamic thought over free will and predestination, the main issue being the extent to which humans, as created beings, are responsible agents. In other words, how much influence, if any, do we have over our actions and the surrounding world: are we masters of our fate or puppets moved from on high?
For pre-Ottoman Islamic theologians this question touched on two major aspects of the divinity-power and justice-and called for an attempt to reconcile God's omnipotence and righteousness. Already by the eighth century, two views had emerged. A party known as Fatalists or Predestinarians (jabriyya or mujbira) championed God's omnipotence, arguing that humans have neither will, choice, nor power to make decisions and that their behavior must be the result of God's will alone, for God can have no rivals in power. Opposed to the Predestinarians were supporters of free will (qadariyya), who objected that God, being all-just, must have granted mankind some measure of agency. Otherwise, religious duty and moral right and wrong would be meaningless. They held that after creating the necessary substructure, God gave humans free will as a test and left them to their own devices, good or ill. To preserve divine power, they maintained that God wills and creates all human actions but only those that are voluntary. This was the belief of a party of rationalists known as the Mu'tazili. 3 The key synthesis of these views came via two later influential theologians, Abû al-Hasan al- Ash'arî (d. 935/36) and Abû Hâ mid al-Ghazâ lî (d. 1111). Al-Ash'arî pointedly emphasized God's omnipotence by adopting an occasionalist or atomistic cosmology, in which God continually "rearranges all the atoms of this world and creates their accidents anew-thus creating a new world every moment."
4 Ash'arî atomism holds that the universe consists of bodies made from atoms and the accidents that inhere therein. On the lowest sublunary sphere of earth, God at every moment recreates these atoms according to His will and continually joins and separates them in a process of generation and corruption (kawn wa-fasâ d; in Turkish, kevn ü fesâ d). Rejecting the idea of any kind of "natural law" or causality outside of God, as such would limit divine power and will, alAsh'arî still acknowledged a complex scheme in which humans "acquire (kasb)" actions created by God and accept responsibility for them. This theory of acquisition was not wholly satisfying, called by some a "moderate fatalism." 5 Al-Ghazâ lî, who is generally credited as a follower of al-Ash'arî, merged this occasionalism with Aristotelian causality and added the finishing touches to what eventually became Sunni Islam's predominant theological orthodoxy. He did this through the idea of "God's custom ('â dat Allah; Trk. 'â detü llah)." Al-Ghazâ lî argued that God wills and creates every event-that is, He is the only true agent in the cosmos-but chooses to create by means of secondary causes, or, at least, through the semblance of causes. God is the only true cause, the Primary Cause, or more accurately, "the one who makes causes function as causes (musabbib al-asbâ We can have no doubt that Ottomans had this theological superstructure in mind when they wrote about causality. Worldly causes (esbâ b) were understood as "secondary" in that they were actualized by God the Primary Cause. 7 In the 1656 work Tuhfetü 'l-kibar fî esfâ ri'l-bihâ r (The gift to the great ones on naval campaigns), the polymath Kâ tib Ç elebi (d. 1657) made a plea for reform in which he explained worldly causation in some detail, hitting all the keywords. He wrote:
God has made this world the world of causes and revealed all events of providence in the world of generation and corruption by way of a cause, showing His power from behind an invisible curtain, through providence. Therefore, all events that occur are in essence traces of God's power, free agent and almighty. Out of His pure goodness and benevolence He granted His servants "particular will." He enabled everyone to use their particular will [ihtiyâ r-ı cü zî] in some respect and realized His custom ['â det] to create the effects thereof. God has often deigned in scripture to teach us that one who has a wish must concern himself with the secondary causes [esbâ b] and observe them and work through them . . . The matter's realization is then left to the will of Him who makes 6 Griffel, , 86-94, al-Ghazâ lî distinguishes between a natural law depending on God's will and one existing independently of the deity; or, following Thomas Aquinas, natura naturata as opposed to natura naturans. Natural laws in Islamic thought are therefore "due to habit and have no more than a juridical status" (Nasr, Introduction, 8-10), while miracles are an abrogation of this habit (khâ rq al-'â da). On miracles, Jonathan Brown, "Faithful Dissenters: Sunni Skepticism about the Miracles of Saints," Journal of Sufi Studies 1 (2012): 123-68. 7 That sources often qualify causes as "visible," "virtual," or "customary" signals a suppositious rather than an actual relationship between cause and effect. See Gottfried Hagen, "Osman II and the Cultural History of Ottoman Historiography," H-Net Reviews (2006) causes take effect [mü sebbibü 'l-esbâ b] . And since any neglect or shortcoming in preparing the secondary causes is tantamount to disobeying God's command, the servant becomes a sinner. 8 The lineage of these ideas in the Ottoman Empire is not fully clear. Kâ tib Ç elebi takes an atomistic view of the universe in which God is the sole agent, and terms like "God's custom" and "Primary Cause" seem closely linked to al-Ghazâ lî's occasionalism and the Ash'arî school of theology. But there are accretions, notably "particular will (ihtiyâ r-ı cü zî or irâ de-i cü ziyye)." In the Ottoman lexicon "particular will," sometimes translated less strictly as "free will," defined human will in its relationship to God's will (irâ de-i kü lliyye). "Particular will" could be exercised in so-called "particular events (umû r-ı cü ziyye)," or worldly events that permitted human influence, while another set of "universal events (umû r-ı kü lliyye)" encompassed larger processes linked to divine preordination. Philipp Bruckmayr has shown that these concepts derive from post-classical works of theology and that they were spread and popularized by the Ottoman pietist Mehmed Birgivî Efendi (d. 1573) and later seventeenth-and eighteenth-century treatises on free will. Moreover, the latter tracts came from a milieu characterized by the "harmonization" of the Ash'arî and Mâ turîdî theological schools, purveyed above all by Naqshbandî Sufi authors. 9 It is hence wrong to look for their origins in any one school of theology or thought.
The important thing to keep in mind is that Ottomans generally accepted the idea of fate but not necessarily fatalistic attitudes. One can believe in fate as a point of doctrine and not be a fatalist, and, as we will see, many Ottoman commentators in fact took an explicitly "activist" stance. As Kâ tib Ç elebi stated, God commands humans to act; to ignore worldly causes is therefore sinful, and initiative is a moral imperative.
THE TESTIMONY OF SOURCES
Contemporary European sources offer ample evidence for free will as an intellectual problem in the empire. Western travelers often commented on Ottoman and Muslim "fatalism," quite to the point of making it an Orientalist trope to which they attributed such things as the region's lack of plague quarantine. It would be easy to dismiss these reports as distorted or as the misapprehensions of outsiders to Ottoman language, culture, and religious traditions. To some extent this is true. It is also true that we must treat them with great care, as works with distinct political and theological agendas. However, some accounts are well informed about Ottoman society. Some authors had resided for long periods in the empire; some spoke local languages; and some had been raised in the empire and were at home there. If anything, Europeans may have distorted "fatalism" by reading it as quintessentially or timelessly Muslim rather than as part of a specific intellectual discourse.
Ignatius Muradcan Tosunyan (d. 1807) wrote perhaps the most authoritative eighteenth-century work on the Ottoman Empire in a European language. In a real sense, Tosunyan was an Ottoman. The child of an Armenian father and French mother who Gallicized his name to Mouradgea D'Ohsson, he served for many years in the Swedish embassy in Istanbul and knew Ottoman society, manners, and languages intimately. 10 In the first volume of his Tableau général de l'Empire othoman (A survey of the Ottoman Empire), Tosunyan, or D'Ohsson, commented on views of free will in the empire as he found them expressed in the 'Aqaid (Creed) of the Mâ turîdî scholar Najm al-Dîn al-Nasafî (d. 1142), a popular religious catechism. Muslim scholars, he said, distinguish between the worldly and spiritual well-being of humans, and the doctrine of predestination relates only to the latter. "Following this principle," he continued, include all humans but only a part of mortals doomed, even before their birth, to be among the elect or reprobate; and that it has no relation to the moral, civil, or political state of man because in this religion he cannot be deprived of free will in any of his actions.
11
According to D'Ohsson, Ottoman scholars espoused the concept of "particular will (ihtiyâ r-ı cü zî)" and asserted that attributing human deeds to God alone was a "sin against religion." Instead, they argued that in every circumstance of life and in all public or private undertakings, one must first ask for divine wisdom through the intercession of the Prophet and all the Muslim saints; then reflect, deliberate, and consult one's own mind, using all the aid that caution, experience, and reason may suggest. It is only after employing these means that human events can be ascribed to divine decree, to which we must submit with an absolute resignation.
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This doctrine aside, D'Ohsson alleged that fatality was widespread in the empire, "a prevailing prejudice . . . ever extending its influence over the civil and moral actions of mankind":
Nearly everyone cleaves to the principle of an immutable destiny fixed by the decrees of heaven, and admits the exercise and effects of free will with extreme reluctance. It taints the people, the ignorant and powerful both, and even monarchs themselves; it influences the actions of each individual as well as the general and public operations of the social body. Hence that lethargic insensibility in which Muslims live, and that perfect acquiescence with which they endure, without inquiry, destructive events, private accidents, and public misfortunes.
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D'Ohsson admitted that fatalism imbued the empire with strength in adversity. However, he complained that it also formed a convenient excuse for inaction and led to the "neglect of the resources of reason, foresight, and sound policy," and that the least complaints against inertia were interpreted as impious challenges to God's will. 14 While it is hard to say whether D'Ohsson's assessment is accurate, he almost certainly oversimplified the range of opinion. Other sources suggest a more complex situation. For example, the Greek author Elias Habesci (fl. 1780s) and the longtime English envoy Sir James Porter (d. 1776) affirmed Lady Mary's "deism" while adding a still greater profusion of views. Habesci wrote not only of deists but of Ottomans whom he considered "Pythagoreans," who believed in the transmigration of the soul; of "professed Cartesians," who doubted everything; and of "Platonists," who believed in the unity of God but rejected Islam's scriptural teachings. Still others, he claimed, were outright atheists who preferred to speak of the "system of nature." 15 In speaking of religion, Porter for his part observed that many Ottomans were philosophical and conversant with what he called the "Aristotelian" and "Epicurean" systems:
And as they find the latter, which they call the Democratical, cuts more effectually at the root, and is more conformable to their present indolence, ease, and security, they generally adopt it; so that, perhaps, without knowing it, they are at once perfect atheists and professed Mahometans. Superstition and its train are a true basis for atheism; there is no medium; from the one extreme the mind is forcibly, though imperceptibly, driven to the other: hence the 13 Ibid., 1:168-69: "Presque toute la nation se tient au principe d'un destin immutable arrêté dans les décrets du ciel, et n'admet que foiblement l'exercice et les effets du libre arbitre. Le peuple les esprits vulgaires parmi les Grands, les Monarques eux-mêmes en sont imbus; il influe sur les actions particulières de chaque individu, commes sur les opéra-tions générales et publiques du corps social. Delà cette espèce d'engourdissement léthar-gique où vit la nation Musulmane, et cette résignation parfaite avec laquelle elle supporte, sans trop d'examen, les événemens fâ cheux, les accidens particuliers, les malheurs publiques." 14 Ibid., 1:169-70. 15 Elias Habesci, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (London: R. Baldwin, 1784), 135-37.
Turks easily plunge into it; and hence among some nations professing Christianity, Materialism is now, with certain ranks of people, the prevailing doctrine.
16
Porter here alluded to the atomism of the ancient Greeks Democritus and Epicurus.
Our picture from European sources is highly variegated and offers a spectrum of views on fate and free will. If some Ottomans were fatalists, others refuted them and still others-deists, materialists, or atheistsappear to have denied that God interfered in the human world at all. We could disarm these interlocutors if Turkish and Arabic sources were silent on the matter. But they are not. In fact, recent scholarship reveals a dizzying range of intellectual schools and activities in the early modern period.
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One indication that Ottomans were concerned with free will and predestination is the large literature on the "particular will" that flourished from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. These treatises have not attracted much scholarly attention but suggest widespread interest in these subjects, as recently shown by Bruckmayr and Hilmi Kemal Altun, who respectively examined thirteen and thirty-five in Turkish and Arabic. For example, Mehmed b. Mustafa Hamid el-Kefevî Akkirmâ nî illustrates how one early modern Ottoman religious authority viewed human will. Akkirmâ nî was a scholar who wrote on theology, jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, and grammar and left a treatise entitled Ef'alü 'l-'ibâ d ve'l-irâ deti'lcü ziyye (Human acts and the particular will). He died in 1760. Akkirmâ nî composed Ef'alü 'l-'ibâ d in simple Turkish and in chapters presenting and refuting the arguments of fatalists (cebriyye), rationalists (mu'tezile), philosophers (felâ sife), and followers of al-Ash'arî as well as more minor figures. He himself identified with the Mâ turîdî school of theology. The work, he said, demonstrates the importance of human will in religious duty and moral responsibility, "so that one may tell the right from the idle view, guard against the idle, and profess the correct school of thought." One may get a sense of Ef'alü 'l-'ibâ d's contents by noting that Akkirmâ nî called Ash'arîs "moderate fatalists" because they believed in human will but only under severe divine constraint. He disagreed with philosophers who said that God gives humans will to create their own actions. To him this showed a superficial grasp of theology, for there could be no other creator than God. 19 As for fatalists, he pointed out that humans would be no more than inanimate objects if their doctrines were true. Religious obligation and reward and punishment would be absurd. "A rational man understands that a voluntary act occurs through his will and acquisition," he said. "When an ass sees a brook it will try to jump it; if the brook is broad and cannot be jumped, it will reconsider and find a different path. Since none of these fatalists have so much sense as an ass, their view is not to be respected."
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Of course, Akkirmâ nî wished to support his own school's position. He wrote of the Mâ turîdîs:
They say that the Lord God is the creator of all of man's actions and the creator of all creation. There is no creator other than Him. However, humans have "particular will" and inner volition concerning piety and sin . . . All told, the Lord God creates man's actions and man acquires them. The truth is that to "acquire" means that man exerts his particular will toward an action; to "create" means that, immediately after this exertion, the Lord God produces the act . . . According to the Mâ turîdîs, voluntary acts, which occur by the actualization of causes, are realized through man's acquisition and God's creation. Man's initiative and actuation of causes are acquisitive and particular to him, while the Lord God's work is creation and particular to Him.
Nor could God be constrained by this arrangement. God creates voluntary actions because it is His will and custom. " 242-43. 20 Ibid., 234-36: "Hımar, bir cedvel-i sag îr gö rdü kde kasd idü b ol cedveli tafra ider. Eg er cedvel vâ si' olub tafra mü mkü n deg il ise tafrayı kasd itmeyü b gayr-ı tarîke sü lû k ider. Ve bilcü mle bu Cebriyyenin hayvan kadar idrâ ki olmamakla mezhepleri asla mü ltefet ve mu'teber deg ildir." 21 Ibid., 243-44, 247: "Bunlar dirler ki Allah Teâ la ef'â l-i 'ibâ dın hâ likidir ve cemi'i-i Not all of the evidence from Ottoman sources is like Akkirmâ nî's treatise-purely academic. There was an insistent undercurrent of debate in the political life of the period and we have representative positions from more run-of-the-mill characters, from cranks to courtiers to would-be reformers.
Government officials weighed in on the matter. In 1731 I . brahim Mü teferrika, the noted reformer and founder of the empire's first Arabic-type printing press, examined recent Ottoman military defeats in a tract called Usû lü 'l-hikem fî nizâ mi'l-ü mem (The rational bases for the ordering of states). Mü teferrika was distressed by what he saw as the empire's military decline and was particularly keen to examine the systematization of European warfare. Taking what we might call an "activist" position, he argued that a well-disciplined and well-drilled army would more often than not defeat a foe that was under-prepared, poorly disciplined, and ignorant of its opponents. He then reflected:
It is secret wisdom that victory, success, and triumph over the enemy depend always and utterly on the Lord God's infinite aid to believers; that rule rests upon His exalted will; and that victory and defeat lie within His preordination. However, God has consigned the outward realization of every matter to initiative through causes.
"Man must operate thus," he claimed. Indeed, the failure to do so risked the dynasty's decline (zevâ l) and dissolution.
22
Like Kâ tib Ç elebi, Mü teferrika drew on an explicitly causal discourse to argue for reform. The point was clearly important. But why? He has given us a hint insofar as his concern with the empire's struggles, so characteristic of the time, evokes two related but conflicting ideas. From the late mevcû dâ tın hâ liki oldur, andan gayri hâ lik yokdur. Lâ kin 'ibâ d içü n ihtiyâ râ t-ı cü zi'yye ve irâ dâ t-ı kalbiyye vardır ki taate ve meâ siye taalluk etmeye kâ biledir . . . Bilcü mle Allah Teâ la 'abdın fi'lini hâ likdir ve 'abd kâ sibdir. Tahkîki budur ki, 'abdın kudretini ve irâ desini fi'l câ nibine sarf itmeye kesb dirler. Bu sarf akebinde Allah Teâ la'nın fi'li îcâ d itmesine halk dirler . . . Ehl-i hakka gö re, mü bâ şeret-i esbâ b ile olan ef'â l-i ihtiyâ riyye, 'abdın kesbiyle ve Allah Teâ la'nın halkı ve icâ dı iledir. Tahkîki budur ki 'abdın sarf-ı kudret ve mü bâ şeret-i esbâ b itmesi kesbîdir ve 'abda mahsû sdur ve Allah Teâ la'nın îcâ dı halkdır ve Allah Teâ la'ya mahsû sdur. sixteenth century onward, Ottoman elites were keenly aware that something had gone wrong. Ottoman arms were no longer carrying the field; Ottoman expansion had stopped, or at least slowed, and the realm was undergoing unprecedented domestic and economic woes. Some popular explanations for these troubles were theories of dynastic rise and fall, particularly that of the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldû n (d. 1406). Ibn Khaldû n had traced dynasties through an implacable cycle of expansion, consolidation, decadence, and decline, a model that resonated with Ottoman readers and seconded the verdict of another theory, Galenic humorism, which likened the realm to a human body with a finite life span. Both models implied that the empire, too, was nearing old age, and fed a central element in the Ottoman historical imagination: imperial decline.
While thinkers like Kâ tib Ç elebi and Mustafa Naimâ (d. 1716) accepted the idea of decline and even incorporated Ibn Khaldû n's theory into their work, they tended to avoid the obvious conclusions. They faced a constraint in what Gottfried Hagen calls "Ottoman exceptionalism." Growing out of myths about the dynasty's origins and destiny, Ottoman exceptionalism held that the empire and its rulers were uniquely just, favored by God, and would endure until the end of time. This was a teleological belief in the dynasty's role in history that insulated it from normal patterns, Ibn Khaldû n's included. There was a definite tension between the ideas of exceptionalism and imperial decline. On the one hand, intellectuals and statesmen recognized the need for action to forestall the processes of decline. On the other hand, they insisted on the empire's superiority and its ability to overcome all challenges-that God would preserve them and ensure their eternal success. Ş erif Mardin once described this paradox in slightly different terms, not so much as a problem of conceptual tools (which the Ottomans did not lack) as one of "cultural self-satisfaction." which precise stage, according to Ibn Khaldû n, they believed the empire to be in-whether "stasis" or "decline"-but both held that it had passed its apogee and needed reform, especially in the military sphere. Resmî's popular history of the 1768-74 Russian-Ottoman war, Hulâ satü 'l-i'tibâ r (A summary of admonitions), was tellingly critical of his peers' attitudes. While Mü teferrika had insisted that a victorious army must utilize secondary causes such as tactics and weaponry, Resmî insinuated that this disastrous war had been provoked, prolonged, and lost by men who argued precisely the opposite: that God grants victory through pious zeal alone. He complained bitterly that religious and military authorities had stymied peace efforts. The "zeal of Islam" would inevitably arise, they vowed, "then we shall have a good fight with the Russians and peace as we desire." 24 The soldier Canikli Ali Paşa, in a widely circulated essay from the late 1770s, largely agreed. Ali Paşa recognized, if in a vague way, that divine preordination and worldly causes work in tandem and that the Ottomans had to reform if they were to reverse their fortunes. The problem for him was that inaction was an easy escape: that "people blame fate whenever there is a flaw in human strategy." 25 A more strident form of activism emerged in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Under Selim III and his Nizâ m-ı Cedîd or New Order reforms, the Ottoman bureaucracy applied the concept of "particular will" to ever-increasing spheres including administration, finance, and social order. Even the language of administration was affected. References to "secondary causes" and causal terminology appear not only in political and theological tracts in this period but also in government documents.
The courtier and historian Ahmed Vâ sıf Efendi (d. 1806) left perhaps the best-articulated version of this stance. Written for Selim, his work helped to provide the New Order with an intellectual framework, a "reformist philosophy" that lends detail to contemporary views of free will and predestination. Vâ sıf's own views are apparent when we look at how he understood causality. Ash'arî occasionalism holds that God is the only true agent in the universe, but that it is God's custom to create through worldly causes. Because God chooses to persist in this custom, events will always, or nearly always, act as if they are linked by cause and effect. There is therefore no outward contradiction between secondary causes and the idea that God is an absolute agent who creates and governs the universe.
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Vâ sıf was of course well aware of this fact, and his work depicts an atomistic universe made intelligible by God's custom. Further, since the universe operates according to visible, secondary causes, humans can predict and in some cases manipulate outcomes. This picture emerges most fully where the historian wrote about the natural world. Vâ sıf offered physical explanations for eclipses, earthquakes, smallpox, and astrology, and believed openly in alchemy. Yet it is important to note that for all his causal reasoning, for all his physical explanations and emphasis on the world's regularity, Vâ sıf was not describing natural laws in a strict sense. To him "God's custom" was not a necessary course. God could abrogate it at any time to create miracles. "While the Creator of elements, compounds, and all creation has sometimes bound His divine omnipotence and will to secondary causes," he wrote in 1794, "let there be absolutely no doubt that He must ever need use an intermediary. His consummate power in creating and producing without cause is a self-evident fact."
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Vâ sıf held a line between the extremes of fatalism and the purely materialistic systems that he associated with Europe. He also used free will as an interpretive framework to understand the empire's history. Recording a crushing 1789 military defeat, and highly critical of Ottoman failings in the field, he wrote that a disobedient mass of soldiers who disregard secondary causes (esbâ b-ı zâ hire) could not match the disciplined, new-style soldier fielded by European states. Indeed, he admitted that it is outwardly difficult, if not impossible, to defeat an enemy without equal or superior organization. The pressing concern was hence "secondary causes," which, he said, included warfare and mathematical fields related to the military sciences. Vâ sıf then pressed the argument at length: 1638, fols. 10a-10b: "Â ferînende-i besâ ît ve mü rekkebâ t ve rû zîdihende-i kâ ffe-i mahlû -kâ t zuhû r-ı kudret ü meşiyetini ba'zen esbâ b-ı zâ hireye rabt etmiş ise dahi kati'en li-maddeti'ş-şü bheti mü zâ vele-i 'amel ve isti'mâ l-ı alete iftikâ rı olmayub bilâ 'illetin min'l-'ilel halk u ihtirâ ' ve icâ d u ibdâ 'da ta'ayyü n-i kemâ l kudreti dahi iclâ -yı bedîhiyyâ tın-dandır." without cause. The Sunnis say that although everything issues uncontingent from God and while man's deeds have absolutely no effect or influence on causes or the ability to influence the course of events, it is God's custom to create everything as an outcome of secondary causes. All sects therefore deem it necessary when they must undertake a matter to first secure the secondary causes and other needful things.
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Much like Mü teferrika, Vâ sıf's point was that humans must act through worldly causes. They cannot rely on God to act for them. He used this credo to preface a further section of his work in the early nineteenth century, calling upon readers in largely the same words to pay attention to causes. 29 Thus it is possible to say that Vâ sıf, while not a deist, moved in fits and starts toward what amounted to the same thing: a view of causality and history set in definitely human terms. Unlike many of his peers, Vâ sıf was not an acolyte of Ibn Khaldû n. Although he felt that the empire had been in decline since the sixteenth century, to him this was caused not by any immutable cycle or God's intervention but by a specific problem. He believed that the empire had stopped innovating to meet its needs while the Christian states of Europe had not. 30 Along with fellow partisans of the New Order such as Mahmud Râ if Efendi (d. 1807) and Kü çü k Seyyid Mustafa Efendi (fl. 1800), as well as sympathetic clerics and dervishes such as Dikhanîzâ de Ubeydullah Kuşmâ nî (d. after 1807), he argued for action and the aggressive application of reason to political problems. This they achieved through the concept of "reciprocation" or mukâ bele bi'l-misl. Originally a legal precept justifying the adoption of enemy tactics and technology, by the late eighteenth century "reciprocation" was used by some Ottoman intellectuals in a much wider sense, almost as an incipient concept of historical progress. Knowledge and reason were universal, they argued. They transferred from dynasty to dynasty through history, and successful civilizations used "reciprocation" to borrow from and gain advantages 28 Vâ sıf, Mehâ sin, I
. stanbul Ü niversitesi Kü tü phanesi nr. 5978, fols. 26b-27a: "Mezheb-i hü kemâ ü zere her emir îcâ bsız ve îcâ b isti'dâ dsız ve isti'dâ d esbâ bsız olmaz ve mezheb-i muhtâ r-ı ehl-i sü nnet ü zere eg erçi cemî' eşyâ fa"â l li-mâ şâ dan bilâ -îcâ b sudû r eder ve ef'â l-ı 'ibâ dın bel mutlaka esbâ b u isti'dâ dın cereyâ n-ı umû rda dahl u tesîri yokdur lâ kin 'â detü llah bunun ü zerine câ rîdir ki her şeyi esbâ b-ı zâ hiresi 'akabinde halk ede pes beherhâ l her mezhebce vâ cibdir ki bir emre şurû ' lâ zım geldikde esbâ b-ı zâ hireyi bidâ yet-i emirde tahsîl ve levâ zım-ı zarû riyye-i hâ liyyeyi tekmîl . . ." 29 Vâ sıf, Mehâ sin (1804), 2:4. 30 Vâ sıf, Mehâ sin, I
. stanbul Ü niversitesi Kü tü phanesi nr. 5979, fols. 5a-6a, 38a-40b, 213a-17a. over rivals. As always, it was up to the individual to act. But with reciprocation, inaction became more risky, and even a threat to the empire's longterm survival.
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It is justified at this point to ask who or what Ottoman "activists" were arguing against. Why did they feel the need to reiterate what, at least in theory, was a theologically orthodox position on free will and predestination? We have some hints. Ahmed Resmî's Hulâ sat is one intriguing source. Resmî's attacks on his peers suggest that he disagreed with some of them over, most obviously, the prosecution of war. He likened these statesmen to a group in Islamic history called the Kharijites, literalists whose mantra was "Judgment belongs to God alone." He and others alleged that the then sultan Mustafa III encouraged such types in their fatalism with words like, "We did not fail in our strategy, but the will of God was thus."
32 The disagreement in this case, it would appear, was over particular will as it applied to warfare.
Resmî's account is admittedly impressionistic. For more insight we might look to an illuminating if extreme case: an obscure author named Fazlızâ de Ali (fl. 1740), a self-appointed social critic who wrote an enormous, rambling diatribe in the mid-eighteenth century. Fazlızâ de was an eccentric. Like many others, he too thought that the empire had been in decline since the sixteenth century. However, he cited sheer impiety rather than any impersonal historical cycle as the reason, especially blaming the influx of heretical Persian philosophies. He was certainly no advocate of rational reform. Indeed, Fazlızâ de's position on free will was highly unorthodox. For him God could neither be comprehended nor in the least restricted in the act of creation. Although he claimed to accept the idea of particular will, he at the same time vehemently opposed all causal systems:
It is idolatrous to think that the being or nonbeing of a thing is both from God and from another. For the only absolute creator and free agent is God. Man has no share whatsoever in creation or any relation with that which is called "cause." In other words, whatever occurs does so without cause and whatever does not occur would not happen even with a cause. But if God wills that there should be a cause, the thing comes about through a cause; what He wills without cause comes about without a cause. Whether through a cause or not, and whether through human exertion or not-everything that occurs or does not occur, in short, is from God alone.
In the context of occasionalism, Fazlızâ de was so extreme that he even denied the notion of God's custom, as he felt it circumscribed God's omnipotence as an absolute agent. This meant that for him every event in the universe was miraculous.
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Interestingly, we find echoes of these sentiments elsewhere. Ahmed Vâ sıf recorded a number of natural phenomena largely to refute misconceptions that they were portents. Relating a partial solar eclipse on June 14, 1760, he likened the event to a famed eclipse that had followed the death of Ibrahim, a son of the Prophet Muhammad. According to him, when the Prophet found that some were calling the eclipse a miracle caused by Ibrahim's death, he corrected them, saying, "Verily are the sun and moon two of the divine signs; they are not eclipsed for the death of one man." Vâ sıf then described the physical conditions under which the sun, earth, and moon create eclipses. 34 For a lunar eclipse on February 4, 1795, Vâ sıf paused again on the Prophet's explanation of these events. He then added:
The divine actions of God occur sometimes regularly and sometimes irregularly and His omnipotence rules over both causes and effects. The learned ulema, however, believe as a point of faith in a divine omnipotence that does not follow general laws, and whenever something strange occurs they take fright due to this conviction.
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33 Kurz, Ways to Heaven, . stanbul Ü niversitesi Kü tü phanesi nr. 5978, fol. 196a: "Hakk sü bhanehü ve te'alâ 'nın ef'â l-ı ilahiyyesi ba'zen 'alâ hasbe'l-'â det ve ba'zen lâ 'alâ hasbe'l-'â det vukû ' bulub kudreti sebeb ü mü sebbeb ü zerine hâ kimdir 'ulema-yı mü tebassırîn 'alâ harki'l-'â det-i 'umû m kudret-i samadâ niyyeye mu'takid olub bir şey-i garîb vukû ' buldukda Vâ sıf was clearly accusing certain members of the ulema of denying God's custom and, thus, causal regularity. He made a similar accusation after a 1784 earthquake in Anatolia. Philosophers blame earthquakes on vapors within the earth, he wrote, but the ulema reject this explanation and insist that they are divine punishment for sin and injustice.
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The greatest challenge in outlining early modern Ottoman discussions of fate and free will is that few explicitly "fatalistic" sources survive. Apart from the odd Fazlızâ de, we are mostly left with allusions or attributions made by hostile interlocutors. It is worth noting that such ideas also do not seem to have resonated much with readers, for while Mü teferrika's and Resmî's work circulated in dozens of copies, Fazlızâ de's survives in a single manuscript. It may be, as one scholar has ventured, that for some Ottomans the denial of free will was related to popular Sufistic practices such as the annihilation of the will.
37 It may also be that the idea had greater hold in specific groups. Vâ sıf for his part claimed that the concept of "particular will" had fueled robust debate in the empire and he criticized some of the ulema for holding erroneous doctrines. Like Resmî, he also identified a fatalistic streak in the Ottoman military. His tract Muhassenâ t-ı 'asker-i cedîd (The merits of the new soldiery), a polemical defense of Selim III's reforms, accused members of the Janissary corps of using fatalistic rhetoric to stymie the program.
38 Certainly Mü teferrika, Resmî, and Vâ sıf had an interest as scribal officials in refuting or preempting such voices. And it is probably not by chance that these two groups, the ulema and military, had much to lose through bureaucratic reform.
If we can credit them, however, Ottoman "fatalists" may simply have been giving different answers to the same questions others were asking: What is wrong with the empire? How can we fix it? Ottomans like Fazlı-zâ de responded to the empire's ills and prospective revival not with forms zalike'l-i'tikâ d sebebi ile havf ederler bu sû retde bu 'â detin cereyâ nı içü n ba'zı esbab zuhû rını men' ü inkâ r etmezler." 36 Vâ sıf, Mehâ sin, ed. Mü cteba I . lgü rel (Istanbul: Istanbul University Press, 1978), 184-85. His account of earthquakes is informed by Aristotle's theory of vapor and exhalation, on which see Nasr, Introduction, and I . hsanog lu, "Introduction of Western Science," 2:25. 37 Kurz, Ways to Heaven, 150-64. Aksan lists (in An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700 -1783 [Leiden: Brill, 1995 , 222) thirty-three copies of Hulâ sat, which is probably a low figure. of activism but in starkly moralistic terms. To him a solution could never come through human reason and effort, which were inherently vain, but only through divine aid. This meant looking back to purer times, returning to moral righteousness, and trusting implicitly in God and God alone. Nor were reformers entirely immune to such pietism. Indeed, the work of the middling scribe Ö mer Fâ ik Efendi (d. 1829/30), Nizâ mü 'l-atîk fî bahri'lamîk (The old order in the abyss), shows the presence in the bureaucracy of critics who supported reform but shared concerns over its trajectorynamely, the New Order's overt materialism and neglect of spirituality. In the early nineteenth century, meanwhile, at least some bureaucrats saw the empire's struggles as an Ibn Khaldû nian contest between nomadic and sedentary forces, one vigorous and noble, the other corrupt and decadent. In both cases, reformers joined their opponents in advocating a return to the purer and ultimately more moral days of old.
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The contours of the debate over fate and free will emerge fully in one final piece of evidence from the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 1783. This event touched off a political storm, as it was the first time that the empire had lost a largely Muslim territory to a European power. Statesmen gathered in secret meetings at the home of the empire's leading jurist, the şeyhü lislâ m, and carefully measured their response. The positions are telling. As Vâ sıf has it, many statesmen clearly thought it best in the situation to act assertively and, in case of war, to trust in God for victory. In one meeting, a judge named Mü ftîzâ de Ahmed Efendi stood and implored his colleagues to reject Russian demands, as they were a pretext and against holy law. A "decisive response" was best: "And if by their own volition they break the treaty, then . . . the winds of victory shall blow to our armies and the dynasty's ill-wishers shall be confounded." All in attendance agreed. Mü ftîzâ de repeated these sentiments in a later gathering. Although he was willing to accept mediation with the Russians, he said that if war broke out, God's preordination would manifest itself and whoever broke the treaty would suffer His wrath.
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It is important to consider the causal premises here. Mü ftîzâ de and his kind seem to have advocated action and implicit trust in their cause, the justness of which would be clear on the battlefield. In early December 1783 39 Ahmet Sarıkaya, ed., "Ö mer Fâ 'ik Efendi, Nizâ mü 'l-Atîk" (I . stanbul Ü niversitesi, 1979 While I have no doubt that God is almighty and powerful and will help the weak and oppressed, it is undeniable that the divine practice is always to create everything through causes. God alone has knowledge of the outcome of future events; therefore, to open the gates of war with such potent enemies while secondary causes are entirely lacking, relying on supernatural aid, is like taking mortal poison and trusting blindly in the antidote's unknown efficacy . . . God forbid there were a rout at the outset. It would be a disaster for the empire.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE FATE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
What I have assembled above resembles a pastiche more than a coherent picture. This is perhaps to be expected. For one thing, our sources do not usually speak openly about free will and predestination but more often use keywords or allusions that are not always clear to modern readers. It could be that learned Ottomans, being familiar with the basic ideas and vocabulary, did not need such obvious signposts to connect with the discourse. 41 Vâ sıf, Mehâ sin, I . stanbul Arkeoloji Mü zesi nr. 355, fols. 70a-70b. 42 Ibid., fols. 73a-73b: "Kuvvet u kudret Hakk'ın olub 'â ciz ü mazlû ma mu'în olacag ında eg erçi şü bhemiz yokdur lâ kin 'â dâ t-ı ilahiyye her şeyi esbâ b ile halk edegeldig i dahi inkâ r olunmaz havâ dis-i â tiyyenin netâ îcine 'ilm Hakk-ı te'â la'ya mahsû s olmag la esbâ b-ı zâ hirede min kü lli'l-vü cû h fıkdâ n derkâ r iken nusret-i gaybiyyeye istinâ den bö yle kavî dü şmanlar ile ebvâ b-ı harbi açmak tiryâ kın hâ siyyet-i mechû lesine ig tirâ r birle zehr-i mü lhiki içmek gibidir . . . Hudâ gö stermeye bâ dî-i emirde perişâ nlık olur ise Devlet-i 'Aliyye'ye yazık olur . . . "
We, conversely, are at a much further remove. It could also be that the Ottomans themselves disagreed on levels and in degrees that we cannot discern today. They had at their disposal centuries of accumulated thought; it would be naïve to think that debate was limited to two or three positions and did not include all manner of gradation and nuance.
Free will and predestination were nevertheless live issues in the early modern empire and tied to interrelated problems. First, they became increasingly important in warfare and reform in the wake of Ottoman military defeats, particularly in the eighteenth century. The discussion of free will most often appears in direct relation to political reform, so that, for example, Kâ tib Ç elebi, I
. brahim Mü teferrika, and Ahmed Vâ sıf all stressed the responsibility to act as part of larger pleas for reform. Removing divine intervention from their calculus and extending the boundaries of human will allowed such figures to argue for a wide application of reason to the empire's political problems and to see the world (if we may use imperfect terms) in a more secularized or deistic way-that is to say, one in which human rather than divine action produces outcomes. Free will went hand in hand with early modern Ottoman reform. It makes sense, then, that groups whom reform threatened, such as the ulema and military, were more likely to voice "fatalistic" attitudes. Whether their position was genuine is a separate question. Causal discourse was common currency to all parties and Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals used these arguments to political ends. Reform, reaction, war, peace, and other topics were all debated in causal terms. To see the dispute simply as a function of interest groups and reformist politics is perhaps too cynical, however. The problem of fate and free will also had an existential side. Early modern Ottomans experienced a crisis of confidence resulting from blows to their sense of exceptionalism. The very real threat to the empire from domestic and external forces posed, in turn, a psychological threat to their deeply ingrained feelings of uniqueness and divine favor. The perception that the empire was in decline demanded answers, for it suggested that they had, for some reason, lost God's solicitude. Our sources indicate a number of reactions. Ottoman texts mostly remain within the limits set by Sunni theological understandings of the matter, there being in all cases an implicit trust that God will protect the empire, which will triumph in the end. But European sources hint at a greater range of opinion that did not make it into Ottoman sources. These were more latitudinarian, some verging on the materialistic or even atheistic. Vâ sıf maintained that this sort of logic was foreign to the empire, but in reality strands of it were there all along. Enthusiasm for Ibn Khaldû n, for example, helped many Ottoman intellectuals to make sense of the realm's "decline." Yet it also raised the disturbing specter of a universal historical determinism that, in theory at least, meant the empire's eventual death and dissolution. If Ottomans were willing to accept the premises of decline, were they not also capable of drawing the implied conclusion? Were they able to contemplate the end of the empire?
For Ottomans, then, early modern debates over free will and predestination may have bubbled from the same intellectual wellsprings as decline and were related to the same crisis of confidence. Statesmen and thinkers wished to discern the empire's historical trajectory and its ultimate fate. Decline asked: What is happening to the empire? Free will posed the distinct but perhaps more psychologically vital questions: Is there anything we can do about it? Or are we all doomed?
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